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APPLYING THE ACTUAL/POTENTIAL PERSON 
DISTINCTION TO REPRODUCTIVE TORTS1 
 
Abstract 
As technology has advanced the level of control that can be exercised over the 
reproductive process has increased. These advances have resulted in a number of claims 
in tort law relating to pregnancy and birth. The three reproductive torts considered here 
are ‘wrongful conception’, ‘wrongful birth’ and ‘wrongful life’. This paper will consider 
the theoretical underpinnings upon which these torts rest, and will suggest that the 
potential/actual person distinction is crucial to these reproductive torts because potential 
persons should not be able to make claims in tort based on alternative conditions that 
could never have been. This is because actions (or omissions) prior to birth determine 
the pre-conditions for existence. Thus, only actual persons (that is those who exist at the 
time of the action or omission) should be able to bring claims in tort. The analysis will 
conclude by arguing that no child should be permitted to bring a claim under any form 
of reproductive tort. 
 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this work is to consider the implications of acknowledging the 
potential/actual person distinction in relation to legal claims relating to reproductive 
torts. This entails consideration of what constitutes a ‘person’ and what impact decisions 
in this area will have upon the existence and identity of potential persons. The discussion 
                                                 
1 The term Reproductive torts originates with Nicolette Priaulx’s work and encompasses all three terms; 
wrongful life, wrongful birth and wrongful conception. While these are distinct terms and all fall within 
negligence for the purposes of this analysis ‘reproductive torts’ is a useful term to identify these particular 
claims. 
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in this paper will be anchored around a discussion of the reproductive torts of wrongful 
birth/conception and wrongful life claims. For the sake of simplicity, wrongful birth and 
wrongful conception will be discussed together because they both relate to parental 
claims rather than children claiming. These torts have been selected because the very 
basis of these claims relates to the existence and identity of a person, who would not have 
existed but for the action giving rise to a tort claim. Collectively these torts deal with actions that 
cause an individual to exist. Furthermore the reproductive torts of wrongful conception, 
birth and life are pertinent to discussing liability for reproductive actions because they 
intersect with claims between parents, offspring and third-party medical providers. 
Reproductive torts thus provide a suitable context within which to discuss the 
potential/actual distinction, psychological personhood and the implications for legal 
reform. 
The format of this article will be as follows. Firstly it will provide an outline of 
why the potential/actual person distinction is important and what that implies for how 
we think of decisions that create new individuals. This will be followed by a section 
assessing the construct of psychological personhood, which is important because it 
highlights that changes occurring before a potential person becomes an actual person 
creates new individuals rather than changing the conditions for a pre-existing one. This 
argument is based upon the fact that different psychological characteristics create 
different people and that this is affected by both mental and physical changes to an 
organism. Thus, prior to actual existence no person exists and changes to the conditions 
in which offspring will be produced are creating new persons. Together these two related 
concepts of potential/actual persons and psychological personhood will serve as a 
platform for reassessing reproductive torts and in suggesting the direction reform of the 
law should take. Essentially the claims will be as follows; potential persons have no 
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claims on the actions of actual persons and only the interests of actual persons can 
sustain claims in tort. 
As we consider the reproductive torts of wrongful birth/conception and 
wrongful life we will see how the courts have encountered the problems which the 
theoretical section on potential/actual persons and psychological personhood expose. In 
further support of the integral nature of the problems with reproductive torts, other non-
UK jurisdictions will be brought into the discussion. For the sake of clarity, the 
differences between the reproductive torts under consideration will be explored in the 
brief description of each ‘tort’ that follows.  
‘Wrongful conception’ - Wrongful conception cases concern the birth of a healthy 
child where the very conception of a child was something that the parents had actively 
sought to prevent (for example by undergoing a vasectomy which was carried out 
incorrectly, so that the parents now have a child which they never intended to have2. 
‘Wrongful birth’ cases occur when a child has been conceived and the parents are given 
incorrect advice or information regarding the condition of the foetus, where such advice 
if given non-negligently might have led to a termination3. These cases also include 
situations where some action by the medical professional causes a disability to occur or 
damages the foetus4. Normally these reproductive torts are relatively straight forward 
claims by existing persons (the parents), that they have been harmed because the medical 
procedure was carried out incorrectly and resulted in the birth of a child, with or without 
a disability. 
However in the UK there is an aberrant situation under s.1 of the Congenital 
Disabilities (Civil Liabilities) Act 1976 (‘CDCLA’) which allows a child to claim under the 
                                                 
2 MacFarlane v Tayside Healhboard [2000] 2 AC 59. 
3 Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2010] 1 W.L.R. 2139. 
4 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] W.L.R. 246. 
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tort of wrongful birth when the actions of a medical provider lead to the child having 
disabilities that it otherwise would not have. It is important to note that this does not 
allow claims by healthy children; it only allows claims under wrongful birth in cases of 
disability caused by medical providers. In this respect wrongful birth claims under the 
CDCLA are somewhat similar to the wrongful life cases. 
 
‘Wrongful life’ - The tort of wrongful life is a claim by a child that they should not 
have been caused to exist at all. In essence offspring claim that life is so intolerable and 
full of inescapable suffering that they are better off not existing rather than being born in such 
a state. The courts are thus asked to conclude that being born was harmful to the child 
and that non-existence was a better condition, of which they have been deprived. The 
term wrongful life is not without controversy as Kirkby J in the Australian case of 
Harriton v Stephens demonstrates. Kirby J stated that in his view “its use, even as a 
shorthand phrase, should be avoided”5. Kirkby J takes this view for a number of reasons, 
but the most important of them are as follows; the phrase wrongful life “denigrate[s] the 
value of human existence” and that by “lumping all such cases under the one description 
there is a danger that important factual distinctions will be overlooked or obscured”6. 
Kirkby J prefers the term ‘wrongful suffering’ as it encapsulates, what Kikby J sees as the 
basis of the claim, that the “negligence … has directly resulted in the present suffering”7. 
In line with judicial terminology the phrase wrongful life will be retained in this article, 
although as we will see, in addition to the just stated objection, this term has different 
interpretations in different jurisdictions. 
                                                 
5 Harriton v Stephens [2006] Unreported Cases High Court of Australia at [8]. 
6 Harriton [2006] at [11] 
7 Harriton [2006] at [10] 
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However, this raises the philosophical problem of comparing existence with non-
existence which is conceptually impossible because non-existence is the absence of 
everything. There is thus no-one who is better off than the child that does exist. This is 
also a legal problem for the courts as they cannot (and are not prepared to) calculate 
damages on this basis and are unwilling to countenance the idea that non-existence could 
be preferable to life8. Currently, such claims are not permitted under UK law9 and, as we 
shall see, other jurisdictions have struggled with the wrongful life tort. In the New Jersey 
case of Gleitman v Cosgrove [1967]10 the court found that a wrongful life claim could not be 
actionable, while in the state of California the case of Curlender v Biosciences Laboratories 
[1980]11 held that a wrongful life claim was sustainable. It is thus by no means a settled 
question as to whether wrongful life claims can be judicially recognised. 
Moreover, wrongful birth and wrongful life actions can be distinguished as claims 
brought by parents and claims brought by the offspring themselves respectively12, 
however this division on the basis of the identity of the claimant does not always apply, 
as we have seen from the CDCLA. Throughout this article, these reproductive torts are 
separated by type (that is wrongful birth/conception and wrongful life) rather than on 
the basis of who brings the claim. It should, however, be borne in mind that who can 
claim, normally, follows the pattern of ‘wrongful conception/birth’ claimants being the 
parents, while ‘wrongful life’ claimants are the children (or someone acting on behalf of 
the child); but this is not always the case and sometimes the claimants will be different as 
under the CDCLA. 
                                                 
8 McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] Q.B. 1166 
9 McKay [1982] 
10 Gleitman v Cosgrove [1967] 49 N.J. 22 
11 Curlender v Biosciences Laboratories [1980] 165 Cal. Rptr. 477. 
12 Harriton at [11] 
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Reproductive torts relate to harms and damages that the law recognises to 
offspring where the action has occurred before their birth, and covers both parents and 
the child claiming against a medical provider. The law can therefore recognise that harms 
can occur before a legal person comes into existence and that once the child exists their 
claim crystallises allowing a claim in tort. However the conclusion of the paper will be 
that children can never claim for the condition they are born in, regardless of what state 
that is or how it was caused. This would require the removal of section one of the 
Congenital Disabilities Act which allows children to claim under wrongful birth cases, 
and retain the non-recognition of wrongful life torts. This conclusion will be based upon 
the fact that decisions and conditions which constitute the new person cannot be 
grounds for claims that they either should have existed in a different condition or should 
not exist at all, because in both cases they (the person claiming) would not exist and thus 
they would not be affected. This line of reasoning is ‘person-affecting’ in its approach, 
which dovetails with tort law as tort requires that a person is in a worse condition than 
they otherwise would be; that is a person is affected by the wrongful conduct13.  
This conclusion would apply whether the conduct comes from medical 
providers, prospective parents or genetic engineers (whether through genetic selection or 
modification) thus only allowing for the interests of actual persons to determine the 
decisions made. Therefore the legal claims of reproductive torts will not be able to be 
based upon harm to the not-yet-existing offspring but would have to be based upon the 
effects of their actions on actual persons. 
 
                                                 
13 C. Elliott and F. Quinn Tort Law (Longman, 2011) p.375. 
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The potential/actual distinction14 and psychological personhood 
The importance of the potential/actual person distinction cannot be overstated because 
it speaks to the difference between those who can suffer harm or gain some benefit and 
those whose very existence is constituted by the decisions being undertaken. It is 
important because the basic aim of tort law, including reproductive torts, is to put 
someone in the situation they would have been in if the tortious action had not 
occurred15. The problem with reproductive torts is that the situation before the tort 
occurred is non-existence, and thus a comparison between existence and non-existence is 
required to calculate damages. As Ackner LJ states “how can the court begin to evaluate 
non-existence … No comparison is possible and therefore no damage can be established 
which a court could recognise” (MacKay v Essex Area Healthboard [1982] at p.1189). Thus 
we do not have to consider whether we take a person-affecting or impersonal approach 
to harm, because tort presupposes that persons are affected. We therefore must be able 
to identify who the person affected is and we must know how they were affected and 
what condition they would have been in prior to the action. 
We can thus see why the potential/actual person distinction is important. 
Decisions which create persons cannot be subject to considerations of harm and benefit 
in relation to the person yet to exist, because the very conditions for affecting persons 
require that they actually exist and potential persons do not fulfil this requirement. 
Moreover if, as in the case of reproductive torts, the action which is complained of did 
not occur then the person would never have existed and thus there would be no ‘person’ 
in a better or worse condition. As David Heyd puts it, the “confusion created by 
wrongful life cases arises precisely from the fact that the wrongful act is the direct cause 
                                                 
14 The potential/actual distinction is a concept that arises in across the literature. See D. Heyd, Genethics 
(University of California Press, 1992); A. Giubilini and F Minerva ‘After-birth abortion: Why the baby 
should live?’ (39)5 J Med Ethics 261. 
15 Elliott Quinn, Law p.375 
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of the plaintiff’s existence”16. Although Heyd is speaking only in relation to the tort of 
wrongful life, this paper will argue that the person-affecting requirement of tort is never 
satisfied in reproductive cases when the child brings the claim. This is because potential 
persons do not exist, and as such changes to the embryo’s genetic make up or physical 
body do not change anyone; rather they alter the genesis conditions which create a person. 
For example, changing whether an embryo has a disability will not change the (potential) 
person who will exist because no one exists, it will only change the conditions of the 
creation process. 
Additionally the existential status of potential persons means that they also fail to 
fulfil the need for a single relationship. As Ernest Weinrib states tort law, as a component 
of corrective justice, “treats the doer and the sufferer of harm as the active and passive 
participants in a single relationship”17. Thus the legal relationship required in tort claims 
is absent because of the necessary requirement of existence for there to be a doer and 
sufferer, a harm and a harmed. 
 
What are psychological persons? 
This paper adopts a psychological personhood approach to the nature of persons and 
personal identity which will now be outlined. The concept of psychological personhood 
is a claim that can be summarised as; persons exist only as an aggregate or a construct of 
the mental capacities of organisms, they do not exist outside of this realm. Thus a person 
is not a person because they are biologically human, or because they possess a name, but 
because they have certain psychological features of memory, self-awareness, a sense of 
self over time, desires and interests between the past, the ongoing now and future 
                                                 
16 D. Heyd, Genethics p.29. 
17 E. Weinrib ‘The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism’ Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 16 (1993) 583, 
p.588. 
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instants18. These features then give rise to psychological connectedness (connections 
between one instant and the next) and together form psychological continuity between 
past, present and future19. Lynne Baker identifies the crucial attribute of a person as the 
‘First-Person Perspective’ (FPP) in which a being can think of itself as the source of 
thoughts and desires20. This is a good means of identifying a person and provides a 
continuous sense of identity within the entity that is a person. The content of personal 
identity, that is, of a person being a particular someone and having specific goals and 
desires is provided by the other psychological features of experience and memory. Thus 
the FPP provides a sense of unity over life and experience, but FPP relies on connections 
and continuity between instants and experiences to provide personal identity. Personal 
identity is therefore the narrative of a specific person’s existence, while being a member 
of the group of beings called ‘person’ is dependent on the capacity for a First-Person 
Perspective. If these connections are absent, then psychological personhood would 
suggest that someone is not the same person over time even if they remain the same 
physical organism. This allows for a self-referencing narrative which builds a biographical 
life, gives meaning and purpose of a person’s life and makes a life plan constructed 
through projects21 possible; this self-recursive construction is what distinguishes a person 
from a non-person. 
This starkly contrasts with how we normally think of ourselves. As a 
consequence, the importance of psychological attributes is greater than under alternative 
theories of persons (such as the view of persons being an indestructible soul or being a 
human organism). Furthermore, it means that persons are fundamentally the font of 
                                                 
18 J. Locke, An essay on human understanding (1690); D. Parfit Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1984) pp.204-209. 
19 D. Parfit, Persons pp.204-209. 
20 L. Baker Persons and Bodies (Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.64. 
21 L. Lomasky Persons, Rights and the Moral Community (Oxford University Press, 1990) p.32. 
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value and for things to be ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ a person must actually exist. An actual person 
who exists can be affected by things that happen around and to them, and thus can make 
a value judgement regarding those actions. Potential persons cannot be affected in a 
similar manner because the necessary condition for them to evaluate the effect of things 
is that they exist, but it is their very existence which is being decided. 
Thus Heyd can state that “they [potential persons] do not meet certain 
preconditions of existence and identity”22, and consequently as we modify and change an 
embryo (that is, as we change the conditions for the potential person’s existence) we will 
be creating a new person, not altering the circumstances for the same person. If this were 
not the case, for example, if person were ‘souls’, then reproductive torts would be 
sustainable, as the existence of the person would be prior to the existence of their body. 
However, in this case, every negative attribute would be included in a tort claim because 
these would all be affecting someone and would be making things worse for them. In the 
case of psychological persons, the person develops after their body, thus actions which 
occur prior to their existence are excluded from affecting them because these actions 
constitute the person who will exist. 
This theoretical platform means that actions giving rise to reproductive torts will 
lead to a new person coming into existence regardless of what these actions are. Thus 
medical providers causing a disability to occur in an embryo will simply be changing the 
constituting conditions of a new potential person. Similarly wrongful conception results 
in a new potential person who would not otherwise exist. Equally, failing to diagnose a 
disability that would lead to the parents terminating the pregnancy would also be creating 
a new person. In both scenarios, no-one is being made better or worse off, no-one is 
being replaced with a different person; rather each scenario creates a new person, 
                                                 
22 Heyd, Genethics p.36. 
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generating a new personal identity from the specific constituting conditions. As wrongful 
life claims would have seen an actual person not come to exist, potential persons have no 
claim upon actual persons and wrongful life claims must be rejected. But we will now 
consider opposing views to this theory. 
 
Potential persons and the ‘right’ to be born (healthy) 
Having set out the argument for reforming reproductive torts by eliminating claims made 
by the child themselves, it is only fair that some counter claims arguing that potential 
persons have interests are considered. The obstacle that must be overcome in order for 
potential persons to have any interests or rights over actual persons is the 
potential/actual distinction, because it is this divide that precludes claims based upon 
actions that affect the constituting conditions of a person’s existence. 
So how then can interests and rights translate across the potential/actual divide? 
Loren Lomasky suggests that harms that affect a future person, but which are caused 
before the person exists can give rise to a retroactive complaint. This is because actual 
persons can recognise “goods-for-the-child [or potential person] that others have reason 
to acknowledge and respect”23, and recognise that the future person is “identifiable as a 
distinct individual upon whom one can act for better or ill”24. Walter Glannon suggests 
that we can “prevent actual (future) people from experiencing pain and suffering and 
thereby avoid defeating their interests in having healthy lives”25. Moreover, Jonathan 
Glover states that “the parental desire for a healthy child fits with the interests of the 
child born as a result of the choice”26. These statements suggest that we can both identify 
                                                 
23Lomasky, Community at p.161. 
24 Lomasky, Community at p.161. 
25 W. Glannon ‘Genes, Embryos and Future People,’ Bioethics 12(2002) pp.187-211, p.193. 
26 J. Glover, Choosing children: Genes, disability and design (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) p.42. 
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the person who will exist and extrapolate from that things which are/will be good for 
them. 
Lomasky claims that recognising ‘good-for-someone’ and being able to identify 
them provides a way to identify harms (over which we have control) for future persons 
thus we should act to prevent these harms occurring. In other words, because offspring 
will become persons who are now identifiable and we can predict the impact of our actions 
on this future person we are subject to their interests. Similarly Glover and Glannon 
claim that a potential person has an interest in being born in a healthy condition. It thus 
seems that, to Glover at least, once a conception occurs we can identify some interests of 
the future person. Glover names, for example, an interest in being “able-bodied and 
healthy”27. Therefore “the interests of the child should set limits to what potential 
parents do”28. 
Glover’s approach seems to satisfy Lomasky’s identifiable individual requirement, 
it therefore seems that a potential person can in some sense be an identifiable subject. 
This is, however, an error because potential persons are not subjects; that is, they (a 
potential person) cannot be affected by actions which will constitute their conditions of 
existence. When we consider how these changes would be brought about we can see the 
claims above do not work. If we cannot change the ‘health’ of an embryo, then the 
potential person can only exist in an ‘unhealthy’ condition. If we can change an embryo 
to be healthy then it would change the constituting conditions of the person being 
created and thus would not be affecting them because we are creating a new person, 
making the ‘identifiable’ individual no longer identifiable. Thus “we can affirm that 
people cannot logically have a right to any genetic endowment, if that constitutes their 
                                                 
27 Glover, Design at p.42. 
28 Glover, Design p.43. 
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identity”29. Health, amongst many other (and possibly all) attributes, changes the 
conditions constituting the potential person, such that each change is a fresh act of 
creation.  
It could be claimed that embryos do have interests which only crystallise once 
they become a person. Yet this makes no logical sense for the same reason that both 
Glover and Glannon’s ‘interest’ and Lomasky’s ‘good-for’ approaches cannot work; 
because each approach requires a subject who benefits from the good or interest. 
However, the persons who supposedly possess these interests or for whom the goods are 
good-for are constituted by such decisions; that is, the conditions for being benefited or 
harmed require a person, a subject to exist, in order to determine value to that person. 
Just as there is no basis for saying that being brought into existence is a benefit, because 
no subject exists who is waiting to be alive, it cannot be claimed that a potential person is 
benefited by being born in a particular condition. And “for the same reasons, we cannot 
hold the child is … an object of maleficence”30; in other words, a potential person who 
becomes an actual person cannot be benefited or harmed by decisions which create and 
cause them to exist. There are no exceptions to the statement that potential persons 
cannot be harmed by being caused to exist; only actual persons have interests which can 
be harmed and thus any regulation has to be based, and can only be based, upon the 
interests of extant persons.  
 
The importance of reproductive torts 
We can now turn to the changes and impact that reproductive torts would have to 
undergo in order to conform to the idea that potential persons have no claim over actual 
persons. Allowing parents (actually existing persons) to claim creates no difficulty at all 
                                                 
29 Heyd, Genethics p.172. 
30 Heyd, Genethics p.109. 
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because they have interests that can be affected by the actions which lead to the existence 
of offspring. On the other hand, allowing children who result from actions which create 
them to claim against someone for acts or omissions causing their existence causes a 
great deal of difficulty. Reproductive torts would need to be reformed because it is 
logically impossible for a child to be harmed or benefited by actions which create them. 
Furthermore as we have seen the necessary relationship between the person who causes 
the harm and the person who suffers the harm is absent, because both parties must be in 
a “single [correlative] relationship”31. It is thus unjust for medical providers to be held as 
having harmed someone when this cannot be the case. Moreover, if it is the action which 
created the individual that is harmful then this applies regardless of whose action it is; 
thus if parents decide not to abort or prevent conception (where they have had accurate 
medical advice) then they are as much to blame as medical providers and should be liable 
under reproductive torts. As we will see when considering the United States case of 
Curlender v Bio-Science Laboratories32, the logical permissibility of a child suing their parents 
has been raised in court before. As Rosamund Scott has highlighted however, allowing 
offspring to claim against their parents would be problematic, not only because of the 
intra-family conflict that might arise, but because it will also “come up against a woman’s 
very personal moral interests in self-determination”33. This of course is not a bar to the 
possibility of allowing offspring to claim against their parents, but explains why we 
should avoid it. 
 Even with these concerns put to one side, reproductive torts still face great 
difficulty in terms of agreeing a basis for calculating damages. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper, the fact that no-one can be better off than the child who actually 
                                                 
31 Weinrib, Formalism, p.588. 
32 Curlender v Bio-sciences Laboratories [1980] 165 Cal. Rptr. 477. 
33 Scott ‘Reconsidering “Wrongful Life” in England after Thirty Years: Legislative Mistakes and 
Unjustifiable Anomalies’ Cambridge Law Journal 72:1 (2013) pp.115-154 at p.148. 
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exists now means that the calculus of damages is impossible to determine. There is no 
better or worse situation for the child bringing the claim, because “nonexistence is not a 
state that can be given a value”34. This means that determining the condition the child 
would have been in (and thus being able to determine the damage caused) is not possible. 
It is clear that the law needs to be changed to end these confusions and contradictions, in 
particular the injustice of assigning liability to some parties involved in the creation of 
people (the medical providers) while exempting others from fault (the parents), and for 
creating liability for a harm that does not occur. 
Further problems in the UK arise from the CDCLA granting locus standi to 
disabled children to sue the medical provider who caused the disability. Some have 
claimed that this is discrimination against people with disabilities as it treats disability as 
harm35. Now obviously it cannot be discrimination because the foetus that would be 
aborted is a potential person and so cannot be discriminated against; that is, there is not 
subject of discrimination. But what the approach mooted here does make clear is that the 
existence of a disability cannot be treated any differently from a ‘normal’ foetus. In other 
words, disability cannot be conceived of as harming the potential person. Moreover, by 
adopting these changes, reproductive torts would be much more certain and clearly 
identify what the harm is, to whom it occurred, and how to remedy or compensate 
someone for the harm caused. It would also remove the need for the courts to answer 
questions relating to the value of beings that are brought into existence. 
The fundamental problems of comparing existence against non-existence and the 
impossibility of harming a potential person remain in all cases where a child is allowed to 
claim. We can now discuss and analyse these reproductive torts in turn, and through this 
process it will be shown that the considerations that are outlined here apply across 
                                                 
34 Heyd, Genethics p.30. 
35 L. Davis, The Disability Studies Reader (Routledge, London 2010). 
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jurisdictions, because it is the very nature of allowing children to claim under 
reproductive torts that gives rise to the problems plaguing the courts and the injustice of 
creating liability when harm cannot occur. 
 
Wrongful birth 
Wrongful birth claims operate on the basis that actual persons, the parents, sought some 
medical intervention which was carried out incorrectly and thus were denied the option 
to abort or prevent the conception of a child. The parents therefore seek damages from 
the medical provider at fault for the harm they have suffered. The only divergence from 
this definition in UK law is that the CDCLA allows offspring to claim for a wrongful 
birth as well as the parents in some circumstances36.  
In the UK the concept of wrongful birth is embodied in case law and 
legislation37, and includes liability for procedures during infertility treatment. Wrongful 
conception claims in the UK are subsumed under the title of wrongful birth cases, thus 
wrongful conception cases will hereafter be included in the term wrongful birth. 
However, the CDCLA only deals with situations where something affects the mother or 
offspring such as physical assault, inaccurate medical advice or a failure to diagnose a 
disability causing medical condition; basically this covers situations where offspring are 
“born with disabilities which would not otherwise have been present”38. Thus the event, 
in order to qualify under the CDCLA, has to be something that inflicts the disability 
upon what would otherwise be healthy offspring39. Currently it permits offspring to 
undertake legal action themselves against the medical provider.  
                                                 
36 CDCLA 1976 s.1A. 
37 CDCLA 1976 s.1; MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59; Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] W.L.R. 246; 
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 530. 
38 CDCLA s.1(2)(b). 
39 CDCLA s.1(2). 
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One of the most prominent wrongful birth cases (although it would be known as 
a wrongful conception case elsewhere) is McFarlane v Tayside Health Board40 . This case 
established that parents may launch a wrongful birth claim when they would not have 
become pregnant but for negligence on the part of the medical organisation. In McFarlane 
the husband underwent a vasectomy which was unsuccessful and as a result his wife 
became pregnant. The House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) held that while it would 
be unjust to have the costs of healthy offspring compensated for, it was fair to have the 
health authority pay for the damage and distress of an unexpected pregnancy. In a later 
wrongful birth case, Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust41, the 
Court of Appeal held that a couple could recover the cost of an unwanted pregnancy due 
to the failure of a sterilisation procedure and the cost of special care due to the disabilities 
of their offspring. However the court refused to extend the coverage of McFarlane to 
cover general costs of raising a ‘normal’ child, therefore restricting compensation to 
distress and disability. Thus parents can claims for the costs and distress of a pregnancy 
and the costs of a disability if they are caused by a fault of the medical provider. This is 
because their interests, rights and goals have been damaged and frustrated by the 
wrongful action. Although, of course, strictly speaking the normal costs of raising the 
child should be included, they are excluded on the basis that the birth of a healthy child 
should not be recoverable because “society itself must regard the balance as beneficial. It 
would be repugnant to its own sense of values to do otherwise. It is morally offensive to 
regard a normal, healthy baby as more trouble and expense than it is worth”42. This 
rejection is thus based upon the interests of actually existing persons in promoting and 
                                                 
40 MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59. 
41 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 530. 
42 MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59, per Lord Millett p.114. 
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valuing the production of children; it is not based on any supposed interests that 
potential people may have. 
This approach has also been taken in some parts of the United States where “in 
virtually all cases, courts have awarded the plaintiff mothers … medical expenses and 
emotional distress damages”43 and have rejected damages for the “cost of raising the 
unexpected child to adulthood”44. However unlike in the UK, claims by disabled 
offspring, like those under the CDCLA, are dealt with differently. In New Jersey case of 
Gleitman v Cosgrove45  a child was born with defects after the mother contracted rubella, 
and received incorrect medical advice that rubella did not pose a risk to the foetus46. 
When the child was born the parents brought a claim of wrongful birth, matching the 
situation in the UK, but the child brought a claim of wrongful life not of wrongful birth 
thus the court permitted a direct claim by the child that more closely matches wrongful 
life cases in the UK47. The case of wrongful life will be considered in the subsequent 
section, but the divergence should be noted. 
There is also the issue regarding the extent to which parents are entitled to 
information regarding their pregnancy. The relationship between information access 
about an embryo’s genetic condition is discussed by Rosamund Scott in her analysis of 
the relationship between abortion and wrongful birth48. That is in the UK law only 
serious conditions can justify abortion49, so according to Scott in the UK medical 
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providers only have to convey information when it relates to a serious condition. For 
example, if parents would abort on the basis of their embryo having a serious medical 
condition and the medical provider failed to give them that information that would allow 
a claim of wrongful birth50. If however the information relates to something trivial, say 
webbed toes, then the parents cannot claim that they would have aborted on that basis 
and that they should have been informed.  
Under the psychological personhood approach suggested here, the embryo 
would have no standing and so the parents could terminate whenever they wish for 
whatever reason, even trivial ones. Thus the adoption of psychological personhood 
would also necessitate a change in abortion law to complete permissibility. Currently the 
decision of what satisfies the criterion of seriousness is “based upon the profession’s 
assessment of the incidence of the risk and its seriousness,”51 but this would no longer be 
the case because the seriousness of the condition would be irrelevant. There is a strong 
link between the information provided and the exercising of the right (in the USA) or 
opportunity (in the UK) to abort; or failing that opportunity suing the medical provider 
for a wrongful birth. Thus, under the approach proposed here the medical provider 
would have no justification for withholding information because it is only the interests of 
the parents that matter; the embryo has no claims to assert against the parents. Thus 
withholding information that the parents would have aborted on, as the parents are no 
longer constrained by the ‘seriousness’ criterion, could lead to a wrongful birth suit. This 
would greatly increase the scope and power of parental reproductive autonomy and 
change the law of and relating to abortion52. 
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As stated earlier, wrongful conception/birth claims are based on the harms are 
clearly suffered by actual persons to their interests, and would therefore not need to be 
changed. The basis of wrongful conception/birth claims is coherent and clearly assigns 
harm and damage both theoretically and legally. However the exception which allows 
offspring to sue under the CDCLA53 must be abolished because it violates the principle 
that potential persons cannot be harmed by actions which are responsible for 
constituting their existence. Moreover it the parties involved are in a direct, connected 
single legal relationship54 because the child does not exist at the time the ‘harm’ is caused. 
It would also prevent parents from being liable to their offspring, and explain why the 
current refusal to recognise such liability makes sense because it is only parental interests 
that count. No claims of harm can be recognised in law because persons exist only as a 
result of those actions. For the most part the law of wrongful conception/birth would 
remain as it is but on the sole basis of harms to the interests of the parents (actual 
persons) and without the aberration of the CDCLA. 
 
Wrongful Life 
Wrongful life claims are made on the basis that the child who exists does so only because 
the women was denied a termination through the fault of the medical provider and that 
the child’s life is so full of suffering that it should not exist. Unlike wrongful 
conception/birth cases, wrongful life cases are brought by the child themselves not their 
parents. The essential claim of wrongful life is that the offspring would have been better 
off not existing. In such cases, the suit for compensation is brought in the name of a 
(typically) severely disabled child who claims that ‘but for’ the negligence of the medical 
provider, they would not have been born at all. This creates a conceptual problem of 
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comparing something with the absence of everything. As Steininger55 points out 
wrongful life claims try to assess the damage inflicted upon offspring from living but do 
not have an alternative which would be worse as the courts are not prepared to compare 
existence to non-existence56. Even if the courts were prepared to make such a 
comparison, it is not clear how such a comparison could be made. 
The case of McKay v Essex Area Health Authority57  made it clear that under UK 
law no offspring can sue for wrongful life. Stephenson LJ stated that it is “contrary to 
public policy, which is to preserve human life, to give a child a right not to be born 
except as whole, functional being” and that it is “impossible to measure the damages for 
being born with defects”58. Ackner LJ also says that “that there are … [no damages] in 
any accepted sense”59. More forcefully Griffiths LJ stated that “I have come to the firm 
conclusion that our law cannot recognise a claim for ‘wrongful life’”60 for the “most 
compelling reason … is the intolerable and insoluble problem it would create in the 
assessment of damages”61. Thus wrongful life claims have been excluded from English 
law for two main reasons; firstly that it is against public interest to compare existence 
with non-existence, and secondly that no damages can be calculated because of the 
impossibility of comparing loss against not existing. As Ackner LJ stated “no comparison 
is possible and therefore no damage can be established which a court could recognise”62. 
McKay was decided before the introduction of the CDCLA but even if that had 
been in force, such a claim would still have been rejected. As Brazier and Cave put it, 
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“[w]here the essence of the claim is that the child should never have been born at all, it 
lies outside the scope of section 1(2)(b)” of the CDCLA63. More than simply being 
outside the technical remit of the Act, the Court of Appeal ruled out wrongful life claims 
because they were against public policy, being a violation of the sanctity of life. Although 
the sanctity of life is not relevant here, because actions creating potential persons create 
the life that would be protected by sanctity, accepting life as a potential damage would 
necessitate “an ‘existence/nonexistence’ comparison64. This would be impossible because 
the court, or indeed anyone, is not capable of determining damages from an assessment 
which involves comparing existence and non-existence, thus no cause of action was 
possible65. This view is matched almost exactly in Germany where the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) stated that “the child’s existence cannot, in 
law, be classified as damage”66 (Schwangerschaftsabbruch II [1993]).  
However this strict logical approach has not always been taken. Rosamund Scott, 
whilst accepting the logical argument regarding existence/non-existence, “that there was 
no-one or no being who could experience non-existence”67, argues that this framing of 
wrongful life claims misses the point. Scott suggests that the issue of wrongful life claims 
“lies in being born under certain conditions, namely when the burdens of life … are so severe 
that they outweigh any compensating goods”68. This view is similar to the one held by 
Kirkby J who believes that it is the suffering in wrongful life cases that should be given 
prominence, even going so far as to argue that “a life of severe and unremitting suffering 
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is worse than non-existence”69. In Curlender v Bio-sciences Laboratories [1980] Jefferson P.J. 
claimed that the claimant “both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others”70. 
In the French case of Perruche we can see this suffering-orientated approach at 
work. The child was allowed to “sue his mother’s doctors because they failed to diagnose 
his condition while she was pregnant, [thus] denying her the choice of an abortion”71. 
The Cour de Cassation stated that “the issue is not his [the offspring’s] birth but his 
disabilities”72. The subsequent public outrage at this decision resulted in the introduction 
of a new provision in the code de l’action sociale et des familles section L114-5 which prohibits 
offspring bringing a claim where they would not otherwise exist and consequently only 
parents can now bring a claim under French law73. We can thus see that the idea that life 
itself could be considered ‘damage’ and thus be a cause of action in law was considered 
unacceptable. Scott’s rejoinder would be that it is the suffering not the life that is 
compensated for, however this author would still argue that this would fall foul of the 
‘actions constituting existence’ problem. 
In contrast, in the state of California there was a drift, albeit haphazardly, towards 
a recognition of a child’s standing to sue. Wendy Hensel74 provides a clear breakdown of 
the Californian court’s decisions and reasoning regarding wrongful life. One of the 
earliest US cases was the previously mentioned case of Gleitman v Cosgrove which found 
that because it was “logically impossible” to “measure the difference between life with 
defects against the utter void of non-existence” wrongful life claims could not be 
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recognised75 thus reflecting the position most commonly held in judicial systems. This all 
changed however in the Californian case of Curlender v Bio-Science Laboratories  where the 
Court of Appeal of California allowed offspring to claims for damages relating to 
“damages for the pain and suffering to be endured … and any special pecuniary loss 
resulting from the plaintiff’s condition”76. Interestingly the court felt that there was “no 
sound public policy reason which should protect those parents from being answerable 
for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring”77. Thus 
in some ways the Californian approach here is the most consistent because it allows 
‘harmed’ offspring to claim against all those who brought it into existence; although the 
basis itself of such a claim is here rejected. 
This prompted a swift response from the Californian state legislature to protect 
parents from such a claim78. Shortly thereafter the California Supreme Court in Turpin v 
Sortini confirmed that the sanctity of life did not preclude claims of wrongful life, and 
allowed damages for “significant medical and financial burden”79 but rejected claims for 
general damages relating to the normal costs of existence. The claim for general damages 
was rejected “because the plaintiff never had a chance to of being born without her 
affliction, and it would be impossible to ascertain the extent of an injury in this 
context”80. However in most other cases the “courts [in the USA] have consistently 
rejected wrongful life actions” reasoning that “life burdened with defects is better than 
no life at all and … that the … child suffered no legally cognisable injury in being born” 
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thus “damages are incalculable”81. The exceptions (Curlender and Turpin) in California 
however “have concluded instead that life is not always preferable to non-existence”82 or 
that damages are incalculable83.  
Rosamund Scott reaches a similar conclusion, after reviewing the arguments set 
out by Kirkby J in Harriton v Stephens, Jefferson P.J. in Curlender v Bio-sciences Laboratories 
and the combined judgement in Perruche, regarding how life should be treated in these 
situations. Scott claims that “while it may be helpful to emphasise suffering rather than 
life per se … care has to be taken that the condition … be so severe that life will be of 
sub-zero quality”84. Thus Scott’s suggestion is that severity is taken as the basis of 
wrongful life claims and when a severe enough condition occurs, then a wrongful life 
claim can be brought against the medical provider. Furthermore, Scott argues that the 
deployment of the existential threshold in these cases is a legal construction providing a 
barrier against wrongful life claims. She suggests that “emphasising that non-existence 
cannot be known is ultimately unhelpful, or besides the point … and loses sight of … 
the normative role of the construct of non-existence”85. Thus Scott is essentially arguing 
that justice has lost out to logic. 
However Scott’s suggestion is rejected by this author for two reasons. Firstly, the 
issue of existence-non-existence is crucial because it is this threshold that limits legal 
actions to those incidents which are cognisable. If we were to accept that non-existence 
was not a boundary to legal action, then we may be placed in the invidious position of 
having to take into consideration potential liability owed to people who may never exist. 
Thus the legal prohibition on potential persons from being able to claim, in this case in 
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reproductive torts, should stand.  Moreover, the importance of the logical existential 
distinction should not be underestimated, as it relates to whether harms have occurred at 
all and to the existence of a correlative relationship between ‘harmer’ and ‘harmed’. 
This leads directly into the second objection to Scott’s proposal. If we accept 
Scott’s suggestion, and allow offspring to claim for actions that occur before their 
existence and use a severity threshold to avoid open-ended exposure to liability just 
mentioned, this would mean that wrongful life claims are permitting legal action where 
no harm to the offspring has occurred. It would thus be fundamentally unjust to allow 
medical providers to be liable for actions which create the particular person who is 
claiming against them. Medical providers would remain liable to the parents who they 
failed to treat with the requisite standard of care, but they would not (and should not) be 
liable to the offspring for creating them. Under the theory of psychological personhood 
set out here, the action which creates a particular person, that is the act that creates a 
factual as opposed to merely potential person, cannot be a harmful act to the person 
created. Thus, cases where wrongful life claims have been recognised should not form 
the basis of law and should be rejected because they rely on the false premise that life is 
comparable to non-existence and that those actions which constitute the existence of a 
person can be classified as beneficial or harmful. 
Additionally, the struggle with wrongful life claims, and in some cases recognising 
them, is down to financial considerations and distributive justice concerns. If there is no 
liability with the medical provider for disabled children then the costs of their care 
cannot be taken from the medical provider but must come from another source. The 
possibility of suing their parents may provide another source of financial security, but 
practical considerations regarding the payment of damages may prevent claims against 
parents as they are likely to already be bearing the costs (or some of the costs) but it 
would be theoretically possible as demonstrated by Californian case of Curlender v Bio-
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Sciences Laboratories. Moreover, as Scott mentions, parental liability would directly conflict 
with the mother’s “self-determination and bodily integrity”86 and thus parental liability 
should be opposed for this reason as well. It thus seems (in the USA at least) that the 
acceptance of claims was aimed at ensuring some financial provision was in place for the 
care of the disabled child; this is comparable to the French court allowing the child to sue 
directly in Perruche. 
However this paper has concluded that actions which create people cannot be a 
cause of legal action because being caused to exist cannot be a harm or damage because 
it is impossible for someone to be harmed by factors constitutive of their existence and 
identity. Once the child is an actual person, and thus the necessary pre-conditions for 
them to have interests is met, society (that is the actual persons who make up the social 
and political entity in which the disabled child lives) do have an obligation to the child, as 
an actual person. Thus, society must make provision for disabled persons and this can be 
achieved through general taxation, a welfare system, public healthcare and so on. The 
child does not have to be able to sue medical providers who cause their existence in 
order to be financially supported, and indeed it has been argued here that children should 
not and cannot sue those who cause them to exist. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has analysed the basis of reproductive torts wrongful conception/birth and 
wrongful life through the application of the potential/actual person distinction. The law 
in the UK, and in other jurisdictions, on wrongful conception/birth are primarily based 
upon the interests of the parents who have suffered some loss or harm. This is the only 
sound basis for these torts. Difficulties and problems arise with wrongful life claims and 
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when wrongful conception/birth claims stray into being claims of the child (as under the 
CDCLA in the UK). Claims by the child try to bridge the potential/actual divide and 
thus allow claims against the medical provider for actions which constitute their very 
existence. This has been shown to be logically impossible as the person-affecting nature 
of torts requires that a subject exists who could have been in a better condition. 
However, when we are discussing actions that cause the existence of a person then the 
absence of that action results in their nonexistence, not their existence in a better state. This 
argument is clearly articulated when Heyd states that nonexistence is “not a state that can 
be attributed to a subject”87. Consequently the use of personal harm as the basis of 
reproductive torts has been ruled out as persons cannot be harmed by actions which 
change who will exist. This means that no potential person has or can claim an interest or 
a right in either existing or existing in a particular condition. 
As the better or worse condition of a subject is a requirement of reproductive 
torts, a child who results from the actions, however wrongful, cannot be permitted by 
the law because it contradicts the internal coherence of tort claims. Coherence is 
important because it allows those subject to the legal system to predict what conduct is 
permissible and what is not. This knowledge is achieved by the consistent application of 
the justification used to in setting out the law. As Weinrib states the law is “not merely a 
collection of posited norms or an exercise of official power but a social arrangement 
responsive to moral argument”88. Weinrib’s suggests that the “[l]aw connects one person 
to another through the ensemble of concepts, principles, and processes that come into 
play when a legal claim is asserted”89. However in order for the law to fulfil its function 
as a set of laws that can successfully be followed, these “concepts, principles and 
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processes”90 must be internally compatible with each other. As we have seen in the case 
of reproductive torts, attempts to deal with claims by or the behalf of children have been 
inconsistent and at times contradictory. 
Such inconsistency arises because reproductive torts do no conform they the 
justification for the existence. That is the crucial relationship requirement whereby “the 
plaintiff and the defendant [are treated] as correlative to one another”91 is absent. If 
reproductive torts are an instrument of “corrective justice”92 then this relationship is a 
crucial justification for the existence of reproductive torts in the first place. More 
importantly as this relationship is the justificatory basis of reproductive tort claims then it 
should inform the structure of tort claims.  
When this relationship is not present then reproductive tort claims cannot be 
sustained, and in the case of potential persons this requirement is never fulfilled. Thus 
the structures of reproductive torts are an ad hoc construction rather than a sound 
coherent and above all justified systematic claim.  The changes to reproductive torts set 
out here are thus a response to this incoherence based upon the consistent application of 
the justificatory theory of persons aimed at forging a “harmonious interrelationship 
among the constituents”93 of reproductive torts. 
The current approach of tort law in judging harm and damage through 
comparisons between the conditions the person would have been in and the condition 
they actually are in, is correct because it requires that an actual persons exist who is 
affected; thus tort law is person-affecting in its approach. However, allowing children to 
claim under any reproductive torts must logically be prohibited. In the case of the UK, 
the current rejection of wrongful life claims must be maintained but the CDCLA must be 
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repealed or reformed to prevent children claiming under the wrongful birth tort. Parents 
must be able to claim on the basis of negligence or misconduct on the part of medical 
professionals because they are harmed; their interests and rights at the time are affected 
and harmed. They (as actual persons) could have been in a better situation than the ones 
they find themselves in. Thus parents and the harm they have suffered can be, and is, the 
correct basis of reproductive tort claims. 
In conclusion this paper advocates a modest legal reform, namely amending the 
CDCLA to prevent claims by children when actions cause disabilities, but it provides 
arguments both to engender this reform and to maintain the rejection of any claims by 
children under reproductive torts (and under wrongful life in particular). The 
implications of the arguments presented here, both in relation to the law and to the 
moral and ethical basis of claims, have farther reaching implications in other 
reproductive issues such as genetic modification, abortion and procreative decisions as in 
all cases the potential person cannot be the basis of any claims or restrictions on the 
conduct of the prospective parents. Only the effects on other actual persons or the 
conduct of the parents themselves (for example on the basis of virtue ethics or a 
standard of behaviour) can ground legal sanction. Particularly as these different 
individuals can form correlative relationships with each other that potential and actual 
persons cannot. These wider implications are beyond the scope this article, and thus 
would need to be (and deserve to be) considered in separate papers. For the moment this 
paper concludes with the desirability of reforming the Congenital Disabilities Act 
suggested earlier and the rejection of any claims by children for actions that are 
responsible for their existence, because potential persons cannot be affected by actions 
bringing them to existence. Basically it comes down to this; there is no justification for 
creating medical provider liability to the offspring for actions which constitute the 
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